Adebayo Alabi
An ultimate output of the political system is public policy. Scholars through numerous theoretical works have examined the influence of interest groups on policy outcomes. On the one hand, some scholars argued that interest groups have a dominant influence on policy outcomes. On the other hand, others argued that policy outcomes are influenced by several factors. Using exploratory approach, Jessica Leight examined public choice theory, with a view to emphasizing the prevalence of self-interest behavior in government. Jessica Leight in this research aimed to present that public choice is no longer an important school of thought in social sciences. Correspondingly, James Q. Wilson examined the impact of interest groups on government agencies using case study approach. Using government agencies like Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), Federal Maritime Commission (FMC), and The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), as case studies, Wilson discussed the responsibilities of government agencies. The aim of Wilson’s study is to present that government agencies’ actions are affected by several factors, which influence of interest group is one of it. Results of Leight’s study provided insights into the influence of interest groups on policy outcomes. Leight noted that public choice scholars like Stigler, Becker, and Tollison argued that interest groups have a dominant influence on policy outcomes. Similarly, she noted that Gerber and Teske suggests that policy outcomes are affected by explanatory variables that includes the strength of interest groups, characteristics of elected legislators, bureaucratic and institutional characteristics, and economic and demographic characteristics. Bearing this mind, Leight opposes the claim that utility maximization is the central motivation of political actors because it lacks coherence. Similarly, she argued that capture, which is a crucial analytical element of public choice as it relates to decision-making is unclear. Leight argued that “the fundamental concept that there is a mechanism by which interest groups establish influence over legislators or regulator rests on empirical foundation are fragile.” This assertion is unsatisfactory and does not provide strong justification for the argument. The argument is based on personal opinion rather than empirical data or comparative analysis or review of current practices. One would have expected Leight to discuss diminishing effect of capture of policy outcome by interest groups. On the other hand, Wilson, gave a better analysis of the diminishing effect of capture on policy outcome. Wilson identified lower cost of political organization and redistribution of political access as efforts taken by the political system to make the capture of policy harder for interest groups. Wilson argued that technological advances in the arts of direct mail solicitation and the emergence of large foundations prepared to make financial contributions to causes they favor has contributed to making information available at a lower the cost. This is instrumental in creating political organization that can serve as a watchdog over an entrepreneurial agency. This is an excellent argument from Wilson. The argument is plausible because of the influence organizations like WikiLeaks have had on creating public awareness to various classified information in recent times. The availability of such classified information to the society can trigger mass protest and movements that may lead to the policy outcome that supports public interests. In addition, it offers a counter explanation to Downs’s rational choice model of voter behavior. Downs (1957) argued that given the high-cost information and the small benefit expected in return, voters rationally decides to remain uninformed. Relying on Downs’s theory, Leight presented public choice process as unimportant to the policy making process. The author based her judgment on the alteration of voter behavior. There appears to be an error in Leight’s assertion. One would have expected Leight to discuss the efforts taken by political actors to encourage citizen participation instead of discrediting public policy process. Put simply, several political activities occurred in the political system within the last five decades of Downs’s work. On the contrary, Wilson discussed the reaction of political actors to the theoretical belief that policy outcomes are being influenced by interest groups. According to Wilson, “new programs were embedded in structures and surrounded by procedures intended to prevent capture, and old methods where possible were modified to achieve the same end.” In the 1930s and 1940s, the electorates have restricted access to classified information and government agencies. However, in recent years, efforts have been made to reduce privileged access and increase competitive access to government agencies. Bearing this in mind, Wilson offered a detailed and unbiased conclusion to the importance of public choice in policy making process. In summary, a review of Wilson study showed that he presented a valid argument on the importance of public choice in public policy making process. On the other hand, Leight’s research explored scholarly articles of public opinions, however, there appear to be some deficiencies in methodology adopted for her conclusions. There is no empirical justification for her conclusions. Instead, her conclusions are based solely on personal opinions. Nevertheless, it is essential to note that studies on the importance of public choice in policy making process is far from being conclusive. Further studies must be undertaken; better arguments must be developed using empirical data to analyze the importance of public choice in policy making process. However, despite some insufficiencies in methodology, the study has provided some insights into the theoretical background of the influence of interest group on policy outcomes. Also, it identified the efforts of political actors in preventing the capture of the political system by interest groups. Maria Carrizosa
Every 20 years, the United Nations agency leading urban development -UN Habitat- hosts a world conference to discuss and settle what the key elements in the urban agenda for the next two decades should be. Habitat I celebrated in Vancouver in 1976 managed to issue a set of 64 recommendations for national action and it also served to exert pressure to the UN to take seriously its intention of addressing the challenges of urbanization, backing financially this emerging UN program. Twenty years later in 1996 in Istanbul, the world met again to set the urban goals for the coming millennium. This time, 171 countries agreed to follow 100 commitments and 600 recommendations (UN Habitat). Today, countries are preparing for the Habitat III world conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development, taking place in Quito in October 2016. The idea of collectively crafting a global urban agenda appears overwhelming if not naïve. However, it has happened before and will happen again next year. It must be taken into account the fact that the planet has already passed the urbanization threshold (the world’s population is mostly urban), that the prevalence of the contribution of cities to climate change is undeniable, that there is an increasing number of transnational stakeholders, and that the two previous conferences indeed achieved some level of influence in policy action for urban development. Currently, countries, cities, NGOs, universities, think tanks, and community groups, are actually preparing to take part in the next Habitat conference, looking how to impact the global urban agenda. How is crafting a global urban agenda different from a massive Babel tower? How can such a large-scale process have some internal coherence? How can this process be preserved from being captured by the stronger actors? On February Friday 26th, The New School will host an event that intends to be part of the preparations towards Habitat III. The structuring of this event is indeed illuminating about the role of groups’ alliances in the process of policy agenda setting. As such, this may be a small example to portray the paradoxical nature of the capture critique, which to a certain extent, pluralism and Stone’s polis model render clear. The event is framed as a court tribunal. On trial are global urban governance structures for their inaction regarding increasing inequality, jobless economic growth, and climate change. The event is hopeful in the possibility that planetary convenings such as Habitat III or IPCC conferences are platforms that pressure policy changes. Because Habitat III is bound to build upon the SDGs, there is the need to bridge the gap between traditional urban planners and environmental professionals, especially with regards to poverty alleviation. What will be needed to tackle this precise issue are amphibious professionals (which are very rare animals), and also alliances across sectors, which need to merge languages and advocate for joint objectives. The aim of the event builds precisely on this point, because it goes beyond the informative raising of awareness and intends to: “launch of an alliance between the Ford Foundation, the Milano School, civil society partners, activists, and community leaders, which intends to critically contribute to the current dialogue of the future of our urban habitats and a new urban agenda” –reads its description. To this tribunal The New School community involved in the planning (which is already bridging across urban-driven and environmentally-driven programs with both domestic and international focus), is inviting partners. The selection of witnesses, experts and judges, pulls together cross-sectoral experts and multi-level organizations with an emphasis in community participation who, as spokespeople from their own groups, meet with a joint cause. In a way, this intends to build a coalition to exert pressure on the global agenda setting. This is far from a political crime, as the capture idea would suggest. Hence, is capture good when exercised by under-empowered groups? Leigh fiercely objects the capture critique put forward by public choice theorists. She underlines its lack of empirical foundation (Leigh mentions that “disconfirming evidence” (Leight, 2010:237) makes public choice theorists prone to “empirical opportunism” (Leight, 2010:236) that tailors case studies to meet their theory). Leigh also points out 1) its rhetorical ambiguity: “public choice theorists do employ precisely such ‘non falsifiable’ formulations and defend them very easily… The ambiguity on this point is not incidental, but central to the theory’s appeal: it serves to obscure a major, and potentially unresolvable, contradiction” (Leight, 2010:225); 2) its analytical fallacies: “Inferring capture on a wide scale from voting patters alone requires a risky, and arguably indefensible, analytical leap” (Leight, 2010:236); 3) and ultimately its uselessness: “To begin, is Wilson’s point that theorizing that politicians’ or regulators’ behavior serves ‘personal interests’: represents a trivial and ‘nearly useless’ interpretation of the theory” (Leight, 2010:227). Capture’s somber perspective of the policy making process was soon contradicted by the pluralistic view: “rational choice theory and pluralism are mirror images” (Leight, 2010:234). However, she swiftly distances herself from pluralism, where every interest has its watchdog and they are all equally powerful. Instead she believes in politics as a creative process for social harmony (Stone, 2012[1988]:10), which works by means of a system of alliances. (Stone, 2012[1988]:30). Stone explains that the unit of analysis in the policy making process are collectives rather than individuals: “groups and organizations, rather than individuals are the building blocks of the polis… policymaking is not just about how problems are solved but also about how groups are formed, split and re-formed to achieve public purposes” (Stone, 2012[1988]:29). This is a fundamental difference with far reaching consequences. It ultimately implies –according to Stone- that rational choice’s main argumentative instruments: prisoners’ dilemma and free riding (Stone, 2012[1988]:234), are flawed. Humans are not self-interested to the point of self-destruction, as the prisoners’ dilemma assures (Stone, 2012[1988]:235). In fact, people are altruistic to the point of not minding the extra costs. Similarly, Stone insists free-riding is less recurrent than collaboration because: “the costs of collective action such as time and effort are [at the same time] its benefits” (Stone, 2012[1988]:237). If alliances between groups are the building blocks of policy making, can capture be thought of as a creative form of politics instead of as corruption? Is there good capture? I say this in a time where the spokespeople from the groups invited to this event, for example, is representing grassroots minorities that have achieved intricate governance structures that enable them to swim the local, national, regional and global arenas in a way that was seldom possible before. I am optimistic. At the same time encouraged and challenged by the fact that this Habitat III planning process includes actors of these type: organizations composed of grassroots and yet directly linked to the main global spheres of decision-making. Organizations like: Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing – WIEGO-, the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights (ACCA), Slum Dwellers International (SDI), and the International Housing Coalition (HIC); are not random coincidental cases. They are grounded organizations, refined networks of associations that are mature enough to make alliances, and furthermost, they are already global players. In my view, the challenge with Habitat III is to look in the eye the opportunity and make the most of it, instead of continue to complain that the bottom is not being heard. OB
Only 24 percent of Americans believe they can trust the Federal Government (Pew Research Center for the People and the Press RSS, 2015). The numbers have fallen since the 1960s—with a few fluctuations—and only topped 50 percent in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. The public’s perceptions of government and “special interests” may play a role in these misgivings. It is generally understood that government is subject to the influence of interest groups. Even Presidents echo this idea. “[You see] a Congress twisted and pulled in every direction by hundreds of well-financed and powerful special interests” –President Carter “I will not stand by while the special interests use the same old tactics to keep things exactly the way they are” President Obama (as cited in Stone, 2012, p. 244). “Capture” is a central tenant of Public Choice Theory and has been used to justify deregulation (Leight, 2010, as cited in Balleisen & Moss). Wilson (1989) contests the pervasiveness of capture among federal government agencies. Where interest groups have an influence, the benefits and costs associated with particular policies play a role in the government’s plasticity. Wilson’s framework describes four political environments and the pressures they exert on government agencies. The framework may not cover all types of policies and doesn’t explain “hidden” advocacy efforts and instances where interest groups lobby despite seemingly minimal costs and benefits. Wilson suggests that the purported frequency of federal government capture is greatly exaggerated. Aside from federal employee professionalism and the mitigating effect of the general public in recent years, interest group power is constrained by prevalence and the type of policy in question. In an interest group agency, the policy at hand is associated with both high benefits and costs so rival groups will attack the government. Agency heads and Congress might favor one group over another over time leaving staffers confused as “things that were once rewarded now are penalized” (p. 81). In the other high benefit type, client agencies, government officials will have to “struggle mightily to avoid having its work influenced by the single, organized group with which it must deal on a daily basis” (p. 79). In entrepreneurial agencies benefits are diffuse but costs are high, so groups will avidly oppose government agency decisions. With both low benefits and costs, majoritarian politics rule and there are no interest groups around to impact agencies. In Wilson’s interest group agency model, groups are rivalrous and actively exert influence. This is not always the case. Schattschneider researched tariffs found there was actually a practice of “mutual noninterference” among industries (Lowi, 1964, p. 680). In Bauer et al’s case study on tariffs, there was “little in the way of direct attempts [among industries] to influence policymakers” despite, presumably, large benefits (Lowi, 1964, p. 683). Only a few businessmen took “sides on the issue” (p. 684). Wilson’s model may still be valid here: many heads of large firms “were too diversified to have a clear interest” (p. 684). Perhaps the benefits were too diffuse to justify advocacy efforts. Wilson’s framework only seems to consider regulatory and distributive policies. One wonders how redistributive policies might fit. Lowi (1964)’s take on interest groups in three policy types provides some insight. Political structure in redistributive policy is dominated by associations and “appears to be highly stabilized, virtually institutionalized,” reflecting “the impasse (or equilibrium) in relations among broad classes of the entire society” (p. 711). Lowi speculates that because redistributive issues involve “influenc[ing] politics towards the centralization and stabilization of Congress,” the decision-making power of lawmakers fades. A review of the Manufacturers’ Association of America found that in a ten-year period, the organization was most active over redistribution issues. This seems to contradict Wilson’s model. Presumably redistribution has low costs and benefits for business interest groups yet the Association was more vocal about such issues than any other. Norms and values must play a role in interest group activity. Individuals and groups have their own definitions of right and wrong and “want policymakers to ‘do right’” (Stone, 2012, p. 243). So despite diffuse costs, an interest group might lobby to reduce social spending because it conflicts with values. A belief in reciprocity, rather than a concern about spending, has been said to account for feelings about welfare (Fong et al., as cited in Gintis et al. 2005). Many Americans believe “poverty is caused by laziness” and those who hold this viewpoint are more likely to disapprove of welfare, even across class levels (p. 279). Individuals’ convictions about reciprocity means they will “share with others similarly disposed” and “punish those who violate cooperative and other social norms” (p. 282). This may explain interest group activity against social spending. Values may also explain why organizations like the National Rifle Association (NRA) and Planned Parenthood spent $28 million and $6 million respectively in 2014 on “outside spending,” despite diffuse, non-monetary costs and benefits (Center for Responsive Politics, 2015). Wilson’s model might also consider ways that interest groups indirectly exert influence. Perhaps in majoritarian politics, interests groups do exist but are active in seemingly unimportant areas to distract attention from core issues. Bacharach and Baratz (1962) discuss mobilization of bias, a phenomenon in which “some issues are organized into politics while others are organized out” (p. 949). Groups might “participate more vigorously in supporting the non-decision-making process than in participating in actual decisions in the process” (p. 949). Stone (2012) notes that policy actors “deliberately try to influence how people perceive the effects of policies and proposals” (p. 241). Groups may even claim prohibitive losses in these “innocuous” areas, “manipulate[ing] the perception of costs and benefits” to their favor (p. 242). Wilson challenges the oft-repeated notion that the federal government is subject to capture. Policy types and related costs and benefits matter, determining who gets involved and the government’s susceptibility to capture. Bauer and Schattschneider’s findings show that interest group behavior doesn’t neatly fit into Wilson’s typologies. Norms and values are important and interest group activities on social and “moral” issues belie Wilson’s almost rational-choice like predictions of behavior. Groups might also lobby for some policies to distract attention from their real aims. Of course not every theory is applicable in every circumstance. As Lowi (1972) notes, “almost any generalization about national politics is inapplicable to as many as two-thirds of the cases of policy formation” (p. 307). References Bachrach, P., & Baratz, M. S. (January 01, 1962). Two faces of power. The American Political Science Review, 947-952. Balleisen, E. J., & Moss, D. A. (2010). Government and markets: Toward a new theory of regulation. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. Center for Responsive Politics: 2014 Outside Spending by Group. Retrieved from: https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?disp=O Lowi, T. J. (July 18, 1964). American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory. World Politics, 16, 4, 677-715. Lowi, T. J. (July 01, 1972). Four Systems of Policy, Politics, and Choice. Public Administration Review, 32, 4, 298-310. Pew Research Center for the People and the Press RSS. Public Trust in Government: 1958-2014 Retrieved from: http://www.people-press.org/2014/11/13/public-trust-in-government/ Stone, D. A. (2012). Policy paradox: The art of political decision making. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. Wilson, J. Q. (1989). Bureaucracy: What government agencies do and why they do it. New York: Basic Books. Anze Zadel
The challenge of accessing good-quality, affordable, and locally-produced food has, in recent years, concerned politicians, health and policy experts, and communities of all socio-economic levels in the United States. But while eating locally-grown food purchased at the local farmers market is a sign of prestige and well-being for the wealthy, access to food has become a matter of survival for many working people. Since the economic crisis hit in 2008, rates of food insecurity have significantly increased in the US. [1] In my essay I will compare two grassroots initiatives addressing issues of inequality and efficiency that managed to find their ways onto policy-makers’ agendas. The first, the NYC bodega bill, was introduced by Congresswoman Nydia M. Velazquez in 2006, and marks the first federal effort around issues of structural access to affordable quality food. [2] The second policy I’ll discuss is a regional planning initiative from Tennessee Valley dating back to the 1930s. I’ve selected these two cases—one contemporary and one historical— because they seem to represent the spirit of Stone’s idea of multiple perspectives. As models of type of policy taking into consideration local initiatives, they also offer important lessons for alternative approaches to policy-making. In her book Policy Paradox, Deborah Stone proposes a new model for policy-making called political reasoning. This model, in contrast to the rational decision making model, doesn’t find equity and efficiency to be mutually exclusive. Stone’s model draws on the strengths of the rational decision-making model, while also allowing for human emotions and moral intuitions as motivating factors. I will be using the political reasoning model to analyze how, using Stone’s approach, we could propose several alternative courses of action to improve upon current US food policies. [3] In recent years, several policies have been introduced which address the issues of food inequality and insecurity. In the spirit of Stone’s political reasoning model, food stamp policy has been improved by making it possible for recipients to use their EBT cards to purchase healthy, locally-produced food at farmers markets. Another example of grassroots policy was designed specifically for the New York City area. In 2006, Congresswoman Nydia M. Velazquez in partnership with a local bodega association proposed a bodega bill, which would provide subsidies for bodega owners in low-income neighborhoods. These subsidies would enable storeowners in underprivileged neighborhoods to offer their customers healthy fresh produce at below-market prices. While the rational model would suggest that food demand and supply is self regulated through market forces, political reasoning suggests instead that we address the underlying structural issues that have created food scarcity in certain neighborhoods in the first place, as well as the social consequences of this scarcity. The opponents of the bodega bill could say that buying healthy produce should be an individual responsibility. Using Stone’s political reasoning comparison we could defend the bodega bill on a basis that healthier citizens from the low income communities will on a longer run cost government less as the current government medical expenditures related to people’s poor nutrition will decrease. Another policy that embodies Stone’s model of good policy-making through local governance bodies and encouraging involvement of local initiatives is an example of regional planning in Tennessee Valley. In the 1930s, following the 1929 stock market crash, president Roosevelt’s administration introduced the concept of regional planning, as part of the New Deal program. Under this new policy, a local authority—as opposed to a state one— was to address the problems of ruinous floods, rural poverty, and economic backwardness in the Tennessee Valley region. In chapter 5 of his book Bureaucracy, What Government Agencies Do and Why They do It, James Wilson writes about the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) as a then groundbreaking initiative with commitment to regional governance and development based on the participation of local grassroots organizations. This local authority would address local human concerns and needs. While the authority was ultimately co-opted by local elites interested more in profit-making than local welfare, the example of the TVA nevertheless stands as a model for how locally-based initiatives can be created to address regional problems. As Stone believes, local effort combines the flexibility and potential for quick action of the market efficiency with the concern for overall well-being associated with the government equity. [4] I would agree with Stone that a good policy should take into consideration principles of both equity and efficiency, and should provide socially responsible and democratic decisions for the entire population. Another important innovation that the political reasoning model suggests is the dispersion of political power as one of the crucial elements for good policy making. Decision-making power offers local communities and officials the possibility to adopt policies according to local conditions. Stone sees the confederacy model of the US, in which each state has slightly different laws and models of governance, as being a model for future policy-making. As Stone suggests, smaller governance units could serve as “political laboratories” where new ideas are tried out before being adopted on a larger scale. Decentralization also allows more citizens to participate in decision-making that affects them through local governing bodies. On the other hand more centralized state government could take policies proposed by grassroots initiatives and implement them on large-scale public works for example building of different infrastructure projects and policies for protecting citizens’ well-being, which are beyond the capacity of local governments. In contrast to state-wide policies, local policy initiatives such as the TVA and bodega bill allow communities and policy-makers to address local issues. After all, food insecurity in New York City has a different face than it does in Buffalo. [1] Alisha Coleman-Jensen, Christian Gregory, and Anita Singh, United States Department of Agriculture Household Food Security in the United States in 2013 report, September 2014 [2] Tracie McMilan, Jicama in the ‘hood: Legislators and local food activists are fighting to get healthy, organic food into the nation's poorest neighborhoods, Salon, Wednesday, August 2, 2006, accessed February 26, 2015 [3] Deborah Stone, Policy Paradox, The Art of Political Decision Making, W. W. Norton & Company, 2011 [4] James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It, Basic Books, 1989 Conrad Walker
Stone’s (2012) treatment of public policy making is an interesting departure from traditional policy sciences. She critiques rationality for its heavy emphasis on the self-maximizing individual and simultaneously argues that it is misguided to extricate politics from policy. By making these claims she sets the stage to discuss policy analysis differently. In her discussion policy analysis takes place in the context of a polis, the Greek word for city-state (p.20). More specifically, the polis is a community, or a political society. Here, politics, policy, and analysis are never divorced, not because an analyst cannot attempt to divorce them, but because it is impractical to divorce them. And in Stone’s discussion, the impracticality of divorcing these three concepts stem from a central idea that binds them all together: public interest. In fact, Stone argues: “the concept of the public interest is to the polis what self-interest is to the market” (p.24). She also contends that the polis is characterized by a unique problem: how to combine self-interest and public-interest OR private benefits and collective benefits. While I agree with Stone’s ideas about the importance of public interest, and her critique of the rationalist, mixed-scanning, and incrementalist frameworks, she also ignores a fundamental aspect of useful policy analysis: cultural critique. It is here that I argue that to strengthen policy analysis, cultural analysis must be better included in policy analytic frameworks. The dominant culture economically, socially and in terms of aggregate number in the United States is Anglo-American. This has always been the case. In recent years their dominance (from a population standpoint) has diminished, but they are still the largest racial group in the country, and their influence over the nation’s most important social, cultural, political, economic, and legal institutions still reflect this dominance. These are not incidental facts, as most policy analysts pretend. Instead, they are foundational to the analyst’s ability to engage in effective and useful policy analysis. For instance, psychologists have attempted to develop this skill; as such, it is now reflective in their care and treatment of diverse clients (McGoldrick et al, 2005). Educators have attempted to develop this skill; as such, curriculum now begins to reflect the needs of diverse students (Moses, 2002). Finally, business has been making strides to better reflect and represent the strengths of a diverse workforce, so multiple cultural perspectives and analyses are now evident in their dominant practices as well. But public policy seems to be lagging. Now, it is also likely that public policy has already played a major role in including cultural analysis in the aforementioned fields (education, business, counseling, etc.), but in those examples it is also possible that cultural analysis only emerged into those fields after intense political battles (see Rojas, 2007). As a result, they emerged as a result of political analysis not cultural analysis. In other words, from a policy sciences standpoint they are simply outcomes of disparate political fights. Thus, there is still truly no conceptual framework for systematically incorporating cultural analysis into policy analysis. For example, social historians agree that individualism is a core value of Anglo Americans (McGill and Pearce, 2005). It has roots in English individualism, which dates back to the 11th century. It is based on individual ownership of private property. It characterizes the nature of interpersonal relationships and is evident in various microeconomic reward structures in the American political economy. In this regard, Mc Gill and Pearce (2005) suggest that individualism is the preferred guide in economic, political and psychological American life. Nonetheless, policy analysts typically do not incorporate an understanding of “Americanness” into American public policy analysis. For example, I would argue that the classic policy debates of our time: the commons problems, moral hazards, and redistributive dilemmas are not as technical as most policy analysis pretend. Rather, they begin from a place of culture, and are nurtured by culture throughout their life cycle. Consider for example, the single parent who relies on public benefits throughout her life while she attempts to establish security and long-term independence. At what point do we only analyze her actions and not the systemic and structural conditions that have shaped her long-term reliance on public welfare? What analytic questions can we ask about a national culture that perpetuates inequalities that exist across certain groups (i.e. race, class, gender)? At what point must we also analyze the society that chooses to pathologize individual behavior (e.g. welfare queen), perhaps as a policy instrument? In other examples, elder care, paternal care and healthcare have long been neglected in this country, and not because of financial wherewithal, but I argue due to cultural wherewithal. This is where individualism and self-egalitarian values help to perpetuate gross societal disparities. Yet, rationality, political analysis and incrementalism do not consider its influence. Instead it accepts individualism as a priori. It is like beginning a race at the ten-yard line. Never starting from the beginning. But this approach will always limit the effectiveness of public policymaking. In other words, rationality is usually concerned with safeguarding property rights as a means to promote efficiency. Incrementalism and the polis pay close attention to battles as a means of preserving property rights; yet, none of these approaches ever attempt to deconstruct or interrogate the all American notion of individualism or liberal egalitarianism. However, careful policy analysis cannot start at the ten-yard line, it must start from the beginning, and culture represents that beginning. Thus, we need a conceptual framework for systematically incorporating cultural analysis into policy analysis. Failure to do so will continue to create policy that only gets part of the picture. References McGoldrick, M., Giordano, J., & Garcia-Preto, N. (Eds.). (2005). Ethnicity and family therapy. Guilford Press. McGill., D.W, & Pearce, J.K. (2005) American families with English ancestors from the colonial era: Anglo Americans in Ethnicity and family therapy. Guilford Press. Moses, R. P., & Cobb, C. E. (2001). Radical equations: Civil rights from Mississippi to the Algebra Project. Beacon Press. Rojas, F. (2007). From black power to black studies: How a radical social movement became an academic discipline. JHU Press. Stone, D. A. (1997). Policy paradox: The art of political decision making (p. 138). New York: WW Norton. Didi Ogude
Bretton Woods Institutions garner a great deal of influence in the global political economy. Developed in the Post-War Era, these intergovernmental institutions were initially ordained to maintain international financial stability and enhance cooperation among nation-states (Harvey, 2009). As such, the likes of the World Bank Group and International Monetary Fund, obliged their members to adopt various policies, most especially, monetary policies. Bretton Woods’s Institutions are not only complicit, but are also instrumental in maintaining free-market liberalism, and policy decision-making based on the rational model that Stone (2012) is compellingly critical of (Harvey, 2009). As authoritative, autonomous and pervasiveness institutions yielding immense political and economic prowess, these institutions have, since their inception, “produce [d], reproduce [d], and transform[ed] norms that in turn shape national policies” (Vetterlein, 2013). In short, neoliberalism (and its bedfellow, rational choice theory) became the hegemonic modes of discourse, led by these arbiters of financial and economic policy-making (Harvey, 2009). Informed by the Washington Consensus, less developed countries were encouraged to take on more ‘market-orientated’ approaches to their policy-making. ‘Structural adjustments’ and ‘austerity measures’ were the order of the day, the critics of which would argue led to increases in poverty and inequality, as well as economic crises starkly felt in Latin American and African nations (Harvey, 2009). Today, the likes of Greece, are fighting these dominant doctrines as they struggle to chart their own future within the Eurozone. Notably, the appointments of the leaders of these institutions, in the form of the World Bank President and IMF Managing Director, are not merit-based. The World Bank has only ever been headed by an American male leader (World Bank, 2015). And although during the last selection of President Jim Yong Kim, less developed countries attempted to thwart this manifestation of patriarchy and American imperialism by nominating the female Nigerian Financial Minister; this tradition is likely to last for decades to come. The IMF, with one exception (yet another male American), has only selected male Europeans as their leaders, excluding Christine Lagarde - the most recent appointment. As noted aptly by Stone (2012), "equality of voice is the most important equality issue of all...the distribution of power shapes all other distributions." Seemingly, global financial policy agenda setting and decision-making, are based on values that are couched in American and Western European imperialism, as well as a patriarchal order. These ‘global’ values and norms are the benchmarks against which the rest of the world are expected to develop their own national agendas. Neoliberalism, for instance, has become so well embedded that it is the commonsensical manner in which many “interpret, live in, and understand our world” (Harvey, 2009). This is an overt instance in which power manifests itself globally. However, Bachrach & Baratz (1962) make a compelling case for what students of public policy tend to neglect, the covert influence of power. They note: “The distinction between important and unimportant issues – cannot be made in the absence of an analysis of the bias in the community; the dominant values and the political myths, rituals, which tend to favor the interests of one or more groups relative to another" (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962). So it is not only that ideas such as ‘austerity’ are privileged as points of departure. Or that ‘rituals’ such as appointing certain nationalities as leaders is normalized. But it’s also that those very issues that do not make it to decision making table is itself an exercise of power; the absence or erasure of issues is a profound exercise of power. Bachrach & Baratz (1962) insist that scholars mistakenly begin by “studying the issues rather than the values and biases that are built into the political system”. In this case, biases towards patriarchy, whiteness, western European and American notions of what is deemed a ‘problem’, how these very problems are framed etc., are implicit yet ubiquitous, and therefore find their way into national policy papers. It is this (these values and biases), that for the “student of power, give[s] real meaning to those issues that do not enter the political arena” (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962). The key question then remains - what policy issues of global and national significance are being forsaken because of these biases and what can be done to make them apparent? References: Bachrach, P. and Baratz, M. Two Faces of Power, The American Political Science Review, 56(4), 1962 Harvey, D. A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 2009, Oxford University Press Vetterlein, A. Norm Setting or Following: The World Bank and the IMF in Comparison, University of Essex, 2013, http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p251196_index.html Stone, D. Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making, 3rd Edition, WW Norton, 2012 Noah Allison In the political scientist’s book, Policy Paradox, Deborah Stone masterfully uncovers the paradoxes that underlie even the most seemingly straightforward policy decisions. Such complications exist, according to Stone, as a result that policy assessments are typically made by using the rational model. While such an ideology misrepresents and diminishes politics, Stone describes the Polis (city-state) as world where there is no such thing as universal truth, where all claims about policy goals, instruments and categories are politically constructed and cannot be reduced to deterministic elements.[i] With this understanding, Stone outlines three groups of challenges in the policy making process: goals, problems and solutions. Using the rational model (market) in comparison to her Polis mode, she rivals these three challenges; however, for the purpose of this paper, an examination of a current equity dilemma (a dimension of goals) regarding membership for Manhattan Community Board 3 (CB3) will be explored through the lens of the Polis, not only illustrating the significant role that politics plays in the policy making process, but also how power at the community level is highly elitist. Determining who gets what, when and how concerning the distribution of goods, services, wealth, income, health, illness, opportunity and disadvantages are one of the most pressing challenges in the policy making process. Given this, it’s important to note that distributions are made up of three significant dimensions, recipients, items and processes. From the outset, Stone argues that equitable distributions are fair, however, they contain both equalities and inequalities. Accordingly, this results in eight distinctive challenges, though for the sake of this piece, a focus will be had solely on the first: membership (recipient dimension). In an ideal world, the distribution of goods to a specific community would be equally divided. However, the delicate question that typically follows is: who should count as a member of the class of recipients? “Defining the class of members entitled to ‘equal treatment,’ whatever that may be, is the core of political controversy.”[ii] Until recently, New York City Community Boards, including CB3, which represents the East Village, the Lower East Side and parts of Chinatown, excluded membership to the community board unless one lived, worked or attended school in the community, was selected by the borough president and local councilmembers and is at least 18 years of age. However, despite these requirements, when understanding the purpose for community boards, that is, to convey a district’s financial needs to the City as it determines its annual budget, to relay citizen complaints to the appropriate agencies and to make recommendations regarding zoning, landmarking, and liquor licensing, in order to gain membership, it follows that one must also have a certain understanding of city politics and to have lived in a jurisdiction long enough recognize the issues and characteristics of a given community. From this, one can deduce that membership is only offered to those who meet the ministerial requirements and gain discretionary approval and is perhaps an example of why the pubic choice theory remains so prevalent in the policy making process.[iii] Recently, a window has opened to help diversify those groups who are potentially integral in helping set the goals for the policy making process. In August of 2014, Governor Cuomo signed legislation that permits selected 16 and 17-year-olds membership to New York City Boards. This extension by Cuomo exemplifies the redefinition of equality through the redefinition of membership and is an example of the diffusion of pluralistic power.[iv] As of this month, 16-year-old Leila Eliot became the newest and youngest person to be appointed to sit on CB3 due to the redefinition of equality. Such a change will undoubtedly help expand the voice of younger folks in the community, as she notes, “to have adults make the decisions like what time parks close I think is not giving the full picture and does not represent the full community.”[v] However, although Eliot is a full-fledged member of CB3, she is still denied membership to discuss prevalent topics within the community. According to urban sociologist, Richard Ocejo, as a result of the oversaturated bar and night life scene in the Lower East Side, CB3 has created a liquor license moratorium to prevent bars from proliferating in certain areas in the neighborhood.[vi] Though, given Eliot’s age, she is denied the right to weigh in on matters regarding all liquor license concerns. Stone would argue that although Eliot or any concerned citizen who is not part CB3 may likely add intellectually respectable insight to such topic, this is an example of inequitable distribution simply on the grounds that “invitations” are necessary to effectively engage in such a discussion. As a result, one can see that even from a particularly micro scale, the processes at the goal setting stage are not only convoluted, but that power at the community level remain highly centralized. [i] Stone, Deborah. Policy Paradox. Chapter 1. Page 9. 2002. [ii] Ibid., 43. [iii] Leight, Jessica. 2010. “Public Choice: A Critical Reassessment.” In government and Markets: Toward a New Theory of Regulation, Eds. Edward J. Ballesien and David A. Moss. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P240. [iv] Bachrach, Peter and Morton S. Baratz, “Two Faces of Power,” The American Political Science Review, 56(4), 1962. Page [v] Cone, Jaime. “Community Board 3′s First 16-Year-Old Member Has Friends in High (School) Places.” Bedford+Bowery. http://bedfordandbowery.com/2015/02/community-board-3s-first-16-year-old-member-has-friends-in-high-school-places/. February 5, 2015. [vi] Ocejo, Richard. Upscaling Downtown: From Bowery Saloons, to Cocktail Bars in New York City. 2014. Chapter 2. Page 72. - Lena
The United States presidential election of 2012 was the most expensive in history. Both candidates topped the $1 billion threshold in contributions received, and The Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) estimates that total spending has amounted to about $6 billion.[1] Outside spending by super-PACs and other groups are the driving forces behind these record-setting numbers.[2] The primary goal of lobbying and campaign contributions is to gain access to decision-makers in government, in order to influence their thinking and acting, and that often with success. What are the implications for policy-making and the welfare system? Does this trend confirm the public choice theory and its conjecture that regulations redistribute rents to existing powerful interest groups instead of maximizing the well-being of citizens? It certainly confutes Wilson’s optimistic perspective on the advancements in restraining capture. The public choice theory is a school of thought that claims that the government does not always act to maximize the well-being of its citizens. Its central preoccupation is to identify deficiencies of regulations and to investigate whose interests are actually being served, aside from those of the public.[3] Voters, legislators, and regulators are part of this system, a collective mechanism that should guide and control government interventions. Yet, in reality, the effectiveness of this mechanism is questionable. Voters are rationally ignorant due to the high costs of informed participation, which explains high rates of voter abstention. Additionally, legislators often make biased decisions under the influence of interest groups, so-called capture. Wilson stresses that in reality, tasks for government agencies “are not defined by law, experiences, directives, or ideologies, but by interests.”[4] One interest group alone, or the rivalry between two groups, can dominate such interests. Would the market and a more rational approach correct such deficiencies more efficiently, as suggested by the public choice theory and what would that mean for governance? Stone does not explicitly pick one side in the Public Choice Theory debate, yet one can assume that she is an advocate of government regulations, despite all its messiness. She raises the interesting question: “[i]f you take politics out of governance, what exactly is left?”[5] Is it the rational utility-maximizing person and the market, which is the center of analysis in the free market theory? In her book the “Policy-Paradox” Stone illustrates the struggle of balancing all the factors that are influencing the policy-making process in great detail. Her key argument revolves around the inappropriateness of rational analysis and the limitations of positivist approaches so often taken in policy research, analysis, and in the process of making policies. Stone suitably argues that the rationality model is incomplete and cannot explain the power of ideas, values, emotions, and beliefs that humans are driven by. In her model, the unit for analysis for society is the “polis”, a community influenced by relationships, dependencies, and loyalties; one that is governed by passion. While the polis seems to be a better replication of reality than the rationality project is, how does it assist us in the policy-making process? The fact that Adam Smith’s invisible hand does not exist and that markets are not perfectly competitive, complete, and provide perfect information to consumers is now largely accepted. But how can the government intervene in the market, overcome its constraints, and increase both efficiency and social justice? According to Stone, policy-making is always connected to making trade-offs, as for example trade-offs between liberty and security, or efficiency or equity. Without a doubt these trade-offs must be considered when drafting policies. However sometimes an economic perspective is necessary in order to not get lost in ideologies. A more progressive tax reform for instance is rational from an economic perspective considering the diminishing marginal return of utility. As rich people experience less utility loss when being taxed at a higher rate than poor people are, why not tax them even more? Here, Leight’s question “utility of what” comes into play and brings us back to the Public Choice Theory. In an attempt to synthesize existing literature on the subject matter, Leight mainly critiques the public choice theory for empirical weaknesses and the insufficiency of the utility function.[6] The reason for Stone’s non-partisan view on the Public Choice Theory might be that it tackles the wrong problem. The question one should ask is not whether more or less regulations are desirable, but how the current system can be more open, transparent, and in accord with the general interests. What is needed are principles of more robust regulation; a system that is flexible due to constant changes in the regulatory system, resistant to capture, and one that relates to issues of democratic accountability. The years since Wilson wrote his piece “Interests” showed that his perspective on the restraints on capture were too optimistic, one wonders how such restraints can actually be achieved. Do U.S. politics need another Watergate scandal to change current election procedures to open policy windows? Stone unfortunately, leaves such questions unanswered. [1] Center for Responsive Politics. http://www.opensecrets.org/ [2] Retro Report. The Cost of Campaigns. Oct. 19, 2014. The New York Times. [3] Gruber, Chapter 9, section 9.4: “Public Choice Theory: the foundations of government failure” [4] Wilson J, Chapter 5: “Interests” in Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It, BasicBooks, 1989. p.73 [5] Stone, D. Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making, 2001, p. 10 [6] J. Leight, Chapter 7: “Public Choice: A Critical Assessment,” in Balleisen and Moss. – Kea I her influential book on policy paradoxes, Deborah Stone (2012) tackles the underlying assumptions of economic public policy analysis. Her thesis can be summarized as follows: Policy-making and policy analysis are not rational nor are they objective. The policy-making process is full of paradoxes and so is policy analysis. The art of policy-making (and analysis) is about making sense of these paradoxes. In this précis, I seek to apply this approach and make sense of policy paradoxes related to the state’s role as employer. One of Stone’s book strengths is its insistent emphasis on the argument that there is no such thing as a single objectively ‘right’ (= rational) solution to public policy problems. In her view, politics and policy-making stand for the ‘struggles over ideas’ on how we ought to live together. Policy-making is about interpretations of values and about whose interpretation wins the political struggle. With regards to the state’s role as employer, one view has become very powerful over the last three decades. It is the idea that state intervention and bureaucracy should be as marginal as possible. Starting from Reagan and Thatcher, the dismantling of the welfare state and the following downsizing of bureaucracy became a common feature of administrative reforms in developed countries in the 1980s and 1990s (c.f. Gruening 2001). The public sector labor market was said to be rigid; civil servants to be inflexible; and one way or the other the market was better equipped to meet people’s needs anyway. In other words, the public sector was inefficient and paternalistic. The solution was to outsource government functions (education, health, security, etc.) and to cut public administration (for an overview on 18 European countries see Alonso et al. 2011). Market operations were believed to produce more choice and more efficient outcomes. This rhetoric created the legitimization for administrative reforms and the reduction of public sector employment. However, it can also be argued that a large public sector and widespread public sector employment have very positive effects on society, for example the provision of employment for disadvantaged demographic groups (goal: social justice). This is actually the point Stone addresses with her paradox argument: There isn’t one correct policy solution. A policy issue always has two flip sides. The public sector cannot be said to be bad or inefficient per se. It fulfills many important societal functions, yet it is a political question to clarify what function a society values more. Employment in governments offers stable careers and flexible working conditions for women/parents. Jobs are usually well paid and function as role model for the private sector. Government institutions guarantee jobs for handicapped people and offer professional perspectives to racial minorities. By outsourcing these functions, we also give up an important societal integrator. It is not a coincidence that countries that are very successful in attaining their ‘social equity’ goals also have large public sectors (see chart 5.1). In this context, the economical concept of the “leaky bucket” (Okun in his work on equality and efficiency, 1975) is a very questionable one since it ignores the fact that with every ”leaky dollar” that gets distributed by the government, government jobs get subsidies too. Therefore, it cannot be argued that this dollar is lost to nowhere (“leaky”). Even if we consider bureaucracy to be slow and inefficient, it is the most effective form of reinforcing social equity in the labor market.
To conclude, public policy analysis can offer an assessment on how much ‘equality’ or ‘efficiency’ can possibly be achieved by a policy measure (here: by expanding or cutting public sector employment). Yet, science cannot settle the political question whether we should value efficiency over equality. List of References Alonso, Jose M; Clifton, Judith; Díaz-Fuentes, Daniel (2001): Did New Public Management Matter? An Empirical Analysis Of The Outsourcing And Decentralization Effects On Public Sector Size, COCOPS Working Paper No. 4. URL: http://www.cocops.eu/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/COCOPS_ workingpaper_No4.pdf [02/25/2015]. Gruening, Gernod (2001): Origin and theoretical basis of New Public Management. In: International Public Management Journal 4: 1–25. Okun, Arthur M. (1975): Equality and Efficiency: the Big Trade-off. Washington: Brookings Institution. Stone, Deborah (2012): Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making. 3rd Edition. WW Norton. |
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