How do issues come to the attention of political actors? There are several theories spanning positivist and post-positivists traditions (Howlet et al. 2009). Keeler (1993) is interested in how governments manage to make major reforms, here defined as “a policy innovation manifesting an unusually substantial redirection or reinforcement of previous public policy” (p. 228). Keeler’s theory is that major policy reforms take place when a “macro window” for change opens due to mandates or crises. According to Keeler there are three mandate mechanisms (“authorization, empowerment, and party pressure”) and three crisis mechanisms (“crisis-mandate, urgency, and fear”) that “open macro-windows for reform” (p. 240). Mandate size alone can project reforms but crises can fortify strong mandates or bolster weak ones.
Keeler defines window size (small, medium, or large) in relation to “the total windows enjoyed by other exceptional reform governments, not more typical governments engaging in ordinary policy-making” (p. 242). One wonders if “ordinary” policy-making windows are of a different size and how the analysis might change if these types were included in the definition.
In examining eight instances of reform windows in the United States, Europe, and Chile, Keeler doesn’t consider “impact success” or even the longevity of reforms. Surely the results would differ if these outcomes were taken into account. He does note in the conclusion that small mandates were unlikely to produce “major innovations” unless, as sometimes occurred in the Kennedy administration, “intense party competition” loomed (p. 263).
Keeler doesn’t focus on window closing mechanisms. Downs offers an explanation, arguing that an “issue-attention cycle exists” (Howlet et al. 2009. p. 100). Problems “capture public attention” and eventually lose prominence as “complexity or intractability becomes apparent” (Howlet et al. 2009, p. 100). Peters and Hogwood tested Down’s issue-attention cycle and found that, not unlike Keeler’s assertions, cycles emerge due to external events such as crises though not all “fade away” (p. 101). Kingdon’s model posits that “the dynamic interaction of political institutions, policy actors, and the articulation of ideas in the form of proposed policy solutions” are responsible for both the opening and closing of windows (p. 103). In some instances political actors set up funding mechanisms to purposely ensure that windows close. All of these theories can be critiqued but all may play a role in different instances of window closures.
One large macro reform window Keeler describes relates to FDR’s New Deal. FDR’s 1932 election featured the requisite “landslide” that characterizes mandates. What widened the window even more were the crises that erupted between the election and inauguration—“unemployment worsened, banks failed in every corner of the country, and thousands of farmers lost their land” (p. 243). As Keeler notes, “public opinion was ‘whipped to a fury’ by the apparent ‘social irresponsibility’ of bankers and businessmen” (p. 243). All three crisis mechanisms surely operated here as economic conditions and public anxiety worsened. An even greater landslide ensued in 1934 with Democrats gaining substantial control of both the House and Senate, creating a mandate for them to pile on major economic policies—“a works program, social security, wages and hours, everything—now or never” Presidential Aid Harry Hopkins remarked (p. 234).
This period of economic instability brings to mind the financial crisis of 2008. The collapse of Lehman Brothers in the wake of the sub-prime mortgage scandal meant that other major financial institutions, such as AIG, were on shaky ground. A fear mechanism was in place as political and financial actors worried that AIG’s failure would have severe repercussions on other banks to which it was tied (United States, 2011). The Federal Reserve Bank lent $85 million to AIG, explaining that “a disorderly failure…could add to already significant levels of financial market fragility and lead to substantially higher borrowing costs, reduced household wealth, and materially weaker economic performance.” (Federal Reserve, 2008). Treasury Chief Paulson later pushed The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. This bill was revised after much “public outcry” and debate but “authorized the Treasury to spend up to $700 billion to purchase troubled assets and inject capital into the nation’s banking system.” The government issued $70 billion to AIG, $50 billion to Citigroup, and $45 billion to Bank of America among other institutions (Sherman, 2009, p. 14). A mandate existed from political actors though perhaps not the general public. Bush signed the bill into law with only a few months left in his Presidency. According to one Public Choice theorist, “public support for the bailout was never strong” and much of the push came from the financial institutions which would profit from government intervention (Congleton, 2009, p. 306).
Windows for policy reforms can be opened by both mandates and crises. Windows may close due to public inattention, political cycles, or institutional actors’ intent. Remaining questions include how the actual outcomes of policies are impacted by mandates and crises and how and why issues disappear from public focus.
References
Congleton, R. D. (2009). On the political economy of the financial crisis and bailout of 2008–2009.
Public Choice (2009) 140: 287–317.
Federal Reserve Board (2008). For release at 9:00 p.m. EDT. [Press release]. Retrieved from: http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20080916a.htm
Howlett, M., Perl, A., & Ramesh, M. (2009). Studying public policy policy cycles& policy subsystems. Toronto (Ontario, Canadá: Oxford University Press.
Keeler, J.T (1993). Opening the Window for Reform: Mandates, Crises, and Extraordinary Policy-Making. Comparative Political Studies, 25(4): 433–486.
Sherman, M. (2009). A Short History of Financial Deregulation in the United States. Center for Economic Policy Research. Retrieved from: cepr.net
United States. (2011). The financial crisis inquiry report: Final report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States. New York, N.Y: Public Affairs.